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Abstract. We present TarTar, an automatic repair analysis tool that,
given a timed diagnostic trace (TDT) obtained during the model check-
ing of a timed automaton model, suggests possible syntactic repairs of the
analyzed model. The suggested repairs include modified values for clock
bounds in location invariants and transition guards, adding or remov-
ing clock resets, etc. The proposed repairs are guaranteed to eliminate
executability of the given TDT, while preserving the overall functional
behavior of the system. We give insights into the design and architecture
of TarTar, and show that it can successfully repair 69% of the seeded
errors in system models taken from a diverse suite of case studies.
1 Introduction
A reactive system with requirements pertaining to its timing behavior is often
modeled as a network of timed automata (NTA) [BY03]. Whether a timing
requirement holds in an NTA can be analyzed by timed model checkers such
as Uppaal [BLL+95] or opaal [DHJ+11]. In case of a requirement violation, a
model checker returns a timed counterexample, also called a timed diagnostic
trace (TDT). Until now, developers must manually identify and correct such
violations by analyzing the generated TDTs. It is therefore desirable to support
this process by an automated tool set that not only determines whether timing
requirements are met, but also proposes syntactic repairs of the NTA in case
they are not.
In [KLW19] we presented an automated repair analysis that analyzes a TDT
obtained from the violation of a timed safety property and returns syntactic
repair suggestions that avoid the concrete executions of the TDT violating the
property. The analysis performs an additional admissibility check ensuring that
the repaired model is functionally equivalent with the original NTA, which means
that no action traces are added or omitted by the repair.
To illustrate the repair analysis consider the NTA in Figures 1(a) and 1(b).
It describes a client that sends a request req to a database db and expects to
receive a response ser within 4 time units after sending the request. The client
contains a clock x that measures the time delay between the request creation and
the receiving of a response in location serReceiving. The NTA allows to execute
a TDT that violates the property, illustrated as a sequence diagram with time
intervals in Figure 1(c). A time interval in the sequence diagram denotes the
minimal and maximal time delay for the message transmission and processing
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(a) Timed Automata client (b) Timed Automata db (c) TDT tdt
Fig. 1. Network of Timed Automata - Running Example
times in db, respectively. The repair computation analyzes the TDT and pro-
duces several syntactic repairs to the NTA that avoid the property violation.
In [KLW19], the computed repairs aim at the modification of clock bounds in
location invariants and transition guards. An example of such a repair is to re-
duce the bound in the time constraint w ≤ 2 from 2 to 1. The modified bound
constrains the maximal transmit time of the req message so that the resulting
NTA receives all responses within the expected time. This repair eliminates the
problematic executions of the TDT in the original NTA without changing the
functional behavior of the system, which is confirmed by an admissibility test
defined in [KLW19]. However, in general, it may not be possible to repair the
model using only clock bound alterations.
Contributions. We present TarTar [tar20], which extends the initial prototype
implementation of the clock bound repair analysis presented in [KLW19] to a
more comprehensive NTA repair tool. Specifically, the extended tool implements
new analyses that can suggest a whole range of repairs in addition to clock
bound variation, such as modifying comparison operators in constraints, clock
references, clock resets, and location urgency. Examples of new repairs computed
for the model in Figure 1 are:
– Exchanging the comparison operator in the constraint w ≥ 1 to w < 1
ensures that the time to send a request is below 1 time unit.
– An exchange of clock z in z ≤ 2 with clock y restricts the time of processing
and receiving the response to at most 2 time units.
– To reset the clock y on the previous transition instead ensures that the time
for sending and processing the request is below 1 time unit.
– Making the location serReceiving urgent reduces the time to receive a re-
sponse to 0.
We call a repair admissible if the repaired system is functionally equivalent to
the unrepaired system. The repair analysis implemented in TarTar returns the
complete set of admissible repairs.
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The repair analysis combines concepts and algorithms from model checking,
constraint solving, and automata theory. A real-time model checker is used to
generate TDTs for a given NTA that violate a given timed safety property. Tar-
Tar translates the TDT into a linear real arithmetic constraint system. An SMT
solver is used to compute a repair for the generated constraint system by solv-
ing a MaxSMT problem. An automata-based language equivalence test checks
whether the repair is admissible in the NTA model. The collaboration between
these subcomponents yields a complex tool architecture. We provide insights into
the design and implementation of this architecture and the underlying infras-
tructure of supporting tools. We evaluate the new repair analyses by applying
TarTar to a number of NTA models. We systematically inject different mod-
ifications in these correct models and compute repairs for the obtained faulty
models, which results in at least one admissible repair for 69% of the TDTs.
Related Work. Other tools exist that compute repairs. The tool BugAssist [JM11]
analyzes C-code by solving a MaxSMT problem. The tool ReAssert [DDG+11]
checks a set of possible modification to repair broken unit tests. Angelix [MYR16],
S3 [LCL+17] and SemFix [NQRC13] compute repairs by symbolic execution and
constraint solving. SketchFix [HZWK18] is based on lazy candidate generation.
All tools are not repairing broken time constraints. We are not aware of related
work on tools for the repair of timed automata models. A more comprehensive
overview of related work on automated repair is given in [LPR19]. A discussion of
work related to the foundations of our repair analysis can be found in [KLW19].
2 Preliminary
2.1 Basic Repair Analysis
We start with a brief summary of the repair analysis approach proposed in [KLW19]
and then discuss the extensions implemented in TarTar.
Preliminaries. The timed automaton model that we use is adapted from [BY03].
Given a set of clocks C, we denote by B(C) the set of all clock constraints
over C, which are conjunctions of atomic clock constraints of the form c ∼ n,
where c ∈ C, ∼∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >} and n ∈ N. A timed automaton (TA) T
is a tuple T = (L, l0, C,Σ,Θ, I) where L is a finite set of locations, l0 ∈ L
is an initial location, C is a finite set of clocks, Σ is a set of action labels,
Θ ⊆fin L× B(C)×Σ × 2C × L is a set of actions, and I : L→ B(C) denotes a
labeling of locations with clock constraints, referred to as location invariants. For
θ ∈ Θ with θ = (l, g, a, r, l′), we refer to g as the guard of θ and to r as its clock
resets. An urgent location is a location that has to be left again without any
delay in time [BFL+18]. Urgent locations are syntactic sugar of Uppaal and can
be expressed as an additional clock p which is reset with entering the location
and a location invariant p = 0. A set urgent contains all urgent locations of T .
A repair analysis is possible for timed safety properties [BY03]. A timed safety
property Π is encoded as a Boolean combination of atomic clock constraints and
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location predicates. A location predicate @l with l ∈ L holds in a state (l′, u) of
a TA iff l = l′. A TA satisfies Π if all reachable states satisfy Π. Otherwise, a
timed model checker returns a TDT leading to a state that dissatisfies Π.
Repair Analysis The repair analysis analyzes the action sequence of the TDT
that leads to a violation of property Π. The delay δi is the time between two
actions ai and ai+1 of the sequence to happen. We define the sequence as a
symbolic timed trace.
A symbolic timed trace (STT) S of a TDT is a sequence of actions S = θ0, . . . ,
θn−1. A realization of S is a sequence of delay values δ0, . . . , δn such that there
exists states s0, . . . , sn, sn+1 with si
δi−→ θi−→ si+1 for all i ∈ [0, n) and sn δn−→
sn+1. We say that a STT is feasible if it has at least one realization.
Given an STT S, the repair analysis proceeds according to the following
steps.
Step 1: Trace Encoding. We first encode S as a timed diagnostic trace constraint
system (TDTCS), expressed in linear real arithmetic. The satisfying assignments
of the TDTCS precisely capture the feasible realizations of S. The TDTCS is
given by the conjunction T of the following constraints:
C0 ≡
∧
c∈C
c0 = 0 (clock initialization)
A ≡
∧
j∈[0,n]
δj ≥ 0 (time advancement)
R ≡
∧
c∈resetj ,
cj+1 = 0 (clock resets)
U ≡
∧
lj∈urgent
dj = 0 (urgent location)
D ≡
∧
c/∈resetj
cj+1 = cj + δj (sojourn time)
I ≡
∧
(c∼β)∈I(lj)
c ∼ β ∧ c+ δj ∼ β (location invariants)
G ≡
∧
(c∼β)∈gj
c+ δj ∼ β (transition guards)
L ≡ @ln ∧
∧
l 6=ln
¬@l (location predicates)
Let further Φ ≡ Π[cn+1/c] where Π[cn+1/c] is obtained from property Π
by substituting all occurrences of clocks c ∈ C by cn+1. Then the Π-extended
TDTCS associated with S is defined as T Π = T ∧ ¬Φ.
Step 2: Repair Encoding. A system repair is a variation of clock constraints that
no longer allows any execution of the TDT that leads to a property violation. We
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encode the clock variations by exchanging the clock constraints of T by modi-
fiable constraints. Each constant bi used as a clock bound in a clock constraint
is replaced by the expression bi + vi where vi is a fresh variable indicating the
change to bi. For instance, a guard with the time constraint cj + δj ∼ βi will
be replaced by cj + δj ∼ βi + vi. For the clock bound analysis, we exchange all
clock bounds in I and G, resulting in a new constraint sets Ibv and Gbv. We then
derive from T a constraint system T bv by replacing I and G with Ibv and Gbv.
The system T bv captures all realizations of the STT S where the clock bounds
of the underlying automaton have been modified according to the chosen values
for the variables vi.
Step 3: Repair Computation. We use T bv to derive an instance of the partial
MaxSMT problem whose solutions yield candidate repairs for the timed au-
tomaton. The partial MaxSMT problem takes as input a finite set of assertion
formulas belonging to a fixed first-order theory. The assertions are partitioned
into hard FH and soft FS assertions. A solution to the problem is a maximal sub-
set F ⊆ FS such that FH∪F is satisfiable. For our analysis, the hard constraints
are given by
FH ≡ (∃δj , cj . T bv) ∧ (∀δj , cj . T bv ⇒ Φ).
This formula describes all assignments to the block bound variation variables vi
such that the TDT no longer admits any realization that violates the property
and such that at least one realization still exists.
To obtain a repair with a minimal number of modified clock bounds, we
utilize the ability of the partial MaxSMT problem to maximize the number of
soft asserts that hold. To this end, let v1 to be vn be an enumeration of all the
clock bound variation variables, then we define the soft assertions as
FS ≡ v1 = 0 ∧ · · · ∧ vn = 0.
Clearly, FH ∧ FS with ∀i.vbvi = 0 is not satisfiable because T bv ∧ FS is equisat-
isfiable with T , and T ∧¬Φ is satisfiable by assumption. However, if there exists
at least one repair for S, then FH alone is satisfiable. In this case, the MaxSMT
instance FH ∪ FS has at least one solution.
Step 4: Admissibility Check. A repair can affect the possible executions of an
NTA. On the one hand, the repair removes the execution that violates the prop-
erty, on the other hand, it can change the functional behavior of the system.
We developed an admissibility check that ensures the functional equivalence of
the original and repaired system in [KLW19]. The functionality of an NTA T
is captured by its untimed language Lµ [AD94], i.e., the sequences of actions
observed in its runs. A repair is admissible iff the repaired NTA has the same
untimed language as the original NTA.
3 New Types of Repair Analyses
The repair analysis presented in [KLW19] and implemented in the prototype ver-
sion of TarTar encodes a TDT as a constraint system in linear real arithmetic.
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It computes syntactic correct modifications of the underlying NTA by introduc-
ing bound variation variables v . For example, possible bound modifications for
a clock bound x ≤ 2 are expressed by a modified clock bound x ≤ 2 + v . The
repairs are computed by solving a partial SMT problem on the TDT constraint
system, involving soft-assert constraints on the bound variation variables. No
repair is computed whenever the soft assertion v = 0 holds, otherwise the com-
puted value of v characterizes the repair. In the following we sketch the new
types of repairs implemented in TarTar.
Operator Variation Repair Analysis. This analysis is motivated by the assump-
tion that a wrong comparison operator in a location invariant or transition guard
may cause a property violation. We assume for the repair encoding that the op-
erators ∼ are indexed according to their order in the sequence 〈 <,≤,=,≥, > 〉.
The possible repairs are encoded by a fresh variation variable vovi where the
value of vovi is the index of the corresponding comparison operator. If x < 4 is
computed as a repair, then vovi = 1. We define appropriate operator variation
constraints Iov and Gov with the help of an n-ary exclusive or operation ⊕
i=0...n
fi
which is satisfied iff exactly one of the formulas fi is true:
Iov ≡
∧
(c∼β)∈I(lj)
⊕
0≤k≤5
c ∼k β ∧ c+ δj ∼k β ∧ vovi = k.
Gov ≡
∧
(c∼β)∈gj
⊕
0≤k≤5
c+ δj ∼k β ∧ vovi = k.
Using this repair analysis, TarTar finds two admissible repairs for the ex-
ample in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) that replace the comparison operator in the clock
constraint w >= 1 by < or <=, respectively.
Clock Reference Repair Analysis. This analysis aims to repair property violations
resulting from errors that stem from the unintended use of a wrong clock variable.
We enumerate all the positions of clock variables in clock bound constraints
using index i and all clock variables using index k. We then introduce for every
position i, a fresh variation variable vcvi whose value k indicates the clock ck
to be used at that position in the repaired model. For example, if y ≤ 2 is a
repaired constraint, where the position of y in the constraint has index 3 and
clock y has index 1, then vcv3 = 1. We define the appropriate clock variation
constraints Icv and Gcv:
Icv ≡
∧
(c∼β)∈I(lj)
⊕
0≤k≤|C|
(ck ∼ β) ∧ (ck + δj ∼ β) ∧ (vcvi = k)
Gcv ≡
∧
(c∼β)∈gj
⊕
0≤k≤|C|
(ck + δj ∼ β) ∧ (vcvi = k)
Applying this repair analysis to the examples in Figures 1(a) and 1(b), Tar-
Tar finds 13 admissible clock reference modification repairs, each involving two
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modifications. Nine repairs exchange y in the constraints y ≤ 1 and y ≥ 1 by
a selection from the set of clocks z, x and w. Four repairs exchange y in the
constraint y ≤ 1 by w or x, and w in the constraint w ≥ 1 by y or z.
Reset Clock Repair Analysis. This analysis aims to repair a property violation
by adding or removing clock resets. We introduce a variation variable v rvi,j for
each clock ci and the transition leaving location λj in the TDT. The reset status
in the extended constraint system is inverted when v rvi,j 6= 0: if ci was not reset
before, it will now be reset, and vice versa. This is encoded by the clock reset
variation constraints Rrv and Drv:
Rrv ≡
∧
ci∈reset(λj)
ci,j+1 =
{
0, if v rvi = 0
ci + δj , otherwise
.
Drv ≡
∧
ci 6∈reset(λj)
ci,j+1 =
{
ci + δj , if v
rv
i = 0
0, otherwise
.
Applying the reset repair analysis to the examples in Figures 1(a) and 1(b),
TarTar finds four admissible repairs. One repair removes the reset of clock y,
another removes the reset of clock z and two repairs add a reset of clock x either
on the transitions towards the state reqProcessing or the transition towards the
state serReceiving.
Urgent Location Repair Analysis. This analysis aims to repair cases where a
faulty usage of urgent locations, which are always left with zero delay after
entering, causes a property violation. Urgency of a location is modeled in the
TDT constraint system by setting the location delay δj to 0. We define a fresh
variation variable vuvi for a location λj . For v
uv
i 6= 0, the urgency for a location λj
is inverted. We encode this idea using the following urgency variation constraint
Uuv:
Uuv ≡
∧
j∈urgent(S)
vuvi = 0 =⇒ δj = 0 ∧
∧
j 6∈urgent(S)
vuvi 6= 0 =⇒ δj = 0.
Applying the urgency location repair analysis to the examples in Figures 1(a)
and 1(b), TarTar finds two inadmissible repairs. The first one makes the state
reqAwaiting urgent, and another repair makes the state serReceiving urgent.
4 Usage of TarTar
We have implemented all repair analyses described in [KLW19] and in this paper
in a tool named TarTar. It provides a graphical user interface, a command-
line interface and a web-interface which enables the execution of this resource
intensive software on compute servers. A user selects one of these interfaces via
arguments provided when invoking the Java library implementing TarTar. For
real-time model checking, TarTar relies on Uppaal.
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– The argument –web launches the web server and corresponding interface.
– Any other arguments launches the command-line mode. When using the
argument –help, the command-line console prints some help information.
– When no arguments are given, the graphical user interface depicted in Fig-
ure 2(a) is launched. The interface offers three tabs. New Analysis starts a
repair analysis, New Experiment starts fault seeding that is described later
in Section 6, and Version shows the current version number of TarTar.
All tool interfaces expect identical inputs in order to start a TarTar analysis
run. The user specifies a file containing the Uppaal model as input and selects
the kind of repair to compute. Optionally, a file with a TDT of the given Uppaal
model can be specified. When no TDT is provided, TarTar automatically calls
Uppaal to compute a TDT. The result of an analysis is one repaired model file
for every computed repair, as well as a text file that summarizes which repairs
are admissible.
(a) TarTar GUI (b) TarTar Architecture
Fig. 2. TarTar Tool
5 Software Architecture and Implementation of TarTar
The software architecture of TarTar is depicted in Figure 2(b). The orange rect-
angles in the figure represent external tools that TarTar calls in the course of
the repair analysis. Uppaal is a state-of-the-art and closed-source model checking
tool, which TarTar uses to compute a TDT for a given model and property.
The SMT solver Z3 [dMB08] is used to solve the generated partial MaxSMT
problems. To check the admissibility of a repair, TarTar uses opaal and the
AutomataLib component of LearnLib [IHS15] since they conveniently provide
functionality used during admissibility checking.
Data Flow Architecture. TarTar consists of many computation steps. For ex-
ample, a TDT is parsed internally and stored as a Trace. This Trace is then
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modified and exported as SMT-LIB2 [BFT17] code. We define a computation
step of TarTar as the computation transforming input into result artifacts.
This focus on artifacts ensures a highly cohesive architecture and clear inter-
faces between any two computation steps. Computation steps with identical
objectives are grouped into a project. This results in four projects depicted by
blue rectangles in Figure 2(b).
– HMI denotes the user interfaces of TarTar. The user inputs a timed model.
TarTar then calls the projects Repair Computation using a faulty timed
model as a parameter. In case that the model is correct, TarTar calls the
project Fault Seeding.
– Fault Seeding seeds faults into a correct model and then repairs the faulty
model by computing repairs using Repair Computation. We use this analysis
in Section 6 in order to benchmark the Repair Computation analyses.
– Repair Computation computes candidate repairs for a faulty timed model,
applies these repairs to the model and finally automatically calls the Admis-
sibility Test.
– Admissibility Test checks for every repaired model whether the computed
repair is also admissible.
Control Flow Architecture. TarTar computes iteratively a set of repairs for a
given faulty Uppaal model and a given property Π using the following steps:
0. Counterexample Creation. TarTar calls Uppaal to verify the model against
Π. In case Π is violated, it stores a shortest symbolic TDT witnessing the
violation in XML format.
1. Diagnostic Trace Creation. TarTar parses the model and the TDT into a
data structure Trace. To add potential repairs, TarTar copies the trace and
replaces the constraints that will potentially be subject to a repair by their
modified variants. The modified trace is then translated to a logic constraint
system, represented in SMT-LIB2 code.
2. Repair Computation. Z3 [dMB08] then solves a MaxSMT problem on the
modified trace constraint system, computing a repair in which the number of
unmodified constraints on the variation variables of type v = 0 is maximized.
Since Z3 can solve a MaxSMT problem only for quantifier-free linear real
arithmetic, TarTar first runs a quantifier elimination on the constraint
system. It then solves the MaxSMT problem with soft constraints requiring
v = 0 for all variation variables. In case no solution is found, TarTar
terminates. Otherwise, TarTar applies the repair to the faulty model and
returns a repaired model.
3. Admissibility Check. TarTar checks the admissibility of a repair and com-
pares the untimed languages of the faulty and repaired models. TarTar
calls the model checker opaal in order to compute the timed transition sys-
tems (TTS) of the original and the repaired Uppaal model. We modified
the opaal model checker in such a way that it returns the TTS for a model.
TarTar then checks whether the two TTS have equivalent untimed lan-
guages, in which case the repair is admissible. This check is implemented
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using the library AutomataLib. In case the two TTS are not equivalent, the
admissibility test returns a trace as a witness for the difference.
4. Iteration. TarTar enumerates all repairs, i.e., all combinations of constraint
modifications that correct the TDT. The repairs are iteratively enumerated
starting with the ones that require the smallest number of modifications to
the model. After a repair is computed, the combination of modified variables
that has been found is prevented from being reconsidered for future repairs
by setting these modification variables to 0 using hard asserts. TarTar
then proceeds with attempting to compute further, previously unconsidered
repairs.
Fig. 3. TarTar Component Architecture
Component Architecture. We imple-
mented TarTar with the general in-
frastructure depicted in Figure 3. The
interface Job provides a general ab-
straction for an algorithm and spec-
ifies the necessary input and result
values of the algorithm by the class
Description. TarTar contains a Job
for the projects Fault Seeding, Repair
Computations and Admissibility Test.
The class Session executes a Job and derivations of Session provide the different
interfaces to the user. With this infrastructure, the analysis implementation in
TarTar is independent from the implementation of the user interfaces, thus
reducing coupling and improving modifiability of the code.
Implementation Details. We implemented the different projects that constitute
TarTar in Java and use the build-management tool maven [Mav19] to manage
the dependencies between the projects. TarTar interacts differently with the
external tools that are needed for different purposes. It calls Uppaal via the
command-line interface in order to generate a TDT, calls Z3 via its API to
compute a repair. For the admissibility check, it calls opaal using a command-line
script and the AutomataLib as an included Java library. For the implementation
of the TarTar analyses the following two details are essential.
We modify constraints in an Uppaal model in order to apply a repair or
to seed a fault. Since neither clock constraints nor transitions possess explicit
unique identifiers in an Uppaal model, it is not obvious which constraint to
change. We therefore uniquely identify a constraint by traversing the constraints
in the sequence stored in the Uppaal model file and use the constraint index in
this sequence as its identifier.
The complexity of the algorithms for solving quantifier elimination and the
MaxSMT problem increase exponentially with the number of variables in the
SMT model [KLW19]. We therefore reduce the number of variables by exploit-
ing implied equality constraints. For example, a variable cj is created for every
clock c in every step j of the TDT. We eliminate cj explicitly before quantifier
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elimination by replacing it with the term
∑
i∈r..j di, where di is the time delay
at step i in the trace and r is the last step before j where c was reset.
6 Evaluation
Evaluation Strategy. In order to evaluate the repair analyses both qualitatively
and quantitatively, we need to synthesize a set of faulty timed automata. To the
best of our knowledge, no benchmark suite for faulty timed automata exists. We
therefore create faulty models by using the fault seeding strategy from [KLW19]
which is motivated by ideas from mutation testing [JH11]. Mutation testing eval-
uates the quality of a test suite for a given program by systematically corrupting
program code and determining the ratio of corruptions that the test suite is able
to detect. We apply the same principle to evaluate the quality of our repair
technique. As proposed in [KLW19], fault seeding modifies a single clock con-
straint so that the result is a set of models that violate a given property. During
the seeding, the bound of a single clock constraint is modified by an amount
of {−10,−1,+1,+0.1M,+M}, where M is the maximal clock bound occurring
in a given model. Our observation was that making either small modifications
that are close to the bound value or modifications in the order of the maximal
bound value M often introduce actual errors in the model. We have extended
fault seeding to the new types of repairs. In particular, fault seeding addition-
ally exchanges the comparison operator in a clock constraint by {<,≤,=,≥, >},
swap a referenced clock with all other clocks occurring in the given model, mod-
ify the reset clocks of any transition, and switch for any location whether it is
urgent. TarTar checks automatically whether a modified TA violates a given
property. If this is the case, it performs all of the above defined repair analyses.
Results. We applied fault seeding to the models in [KLW19] and analyzed the ob-
tained TDTs using the above described repair analyses implemented in TarTar.
All analyses were performed on a computer with an i7-6700K CPU (4.00GHz),
60GB of RAM and a 64 bit Linux operating system. We summarize the results
of the experiment per considered model (Table 1) and per type of considered
repair (Table 2). Column Sd contains the count of seeded faults that result in
a number #T of faulty models. TUP is the maximal time that Uppaal needs to
Repair #Sd #T TUP Ln #R #A #S TQE #O TR MR #Vr #Cn TAdm MA
db rep. 110 13 0.016 4 229 138 9 89.346 2 0.911 14.53 30 91 2.080 45
csma 191 10 0.012 2 70 26 8 0.049 0 0.023 0.58 16 72 1.825 75
elevator 88 5 0.011 1 7 5 4 0.049 0 0.020 0.53 6 28 1.665 17
viking 310 9 0.015 18 9 7 5 86.539 21 1.436 20.07 120 180 1.952 543
bando 1,955 40 0.111 279 4,061 209 21 31.555 46 4.922 20.86 1,156 8,144 19.57 1251
Pacemaker 1,187 12 0.022 9 62 19 10 0.663 20 0.325 2.59 116 988 1.994 206
SBR 353 50 0.027 84 751 660 31 117.057 86 2.686 37.16 765 1,211 138.004 211
FDDI 314 36 0.014 11 166 105 34 29.859 51 3.074 9.70 116 272 2.241 128
Table 1. Experimental results according to model.
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Repair #R #A #S TQE #O TR MR #Vr #Cn TAdm MA
Bound Modification 533 364 85 15.209 8 4.922 20.86 1,156 2,498 138.004 525
Operator Variation 3,929 96 51 117.057 44 2.686 37.16 996 8,144 59.117 543
Clock Reference 693 625 35 33.282 61 3.074 14.13 1,120 5,355 116.944 206
Reset Clock 45 37 13 89.346 113 0.911 14.53 996 2,836 2.051 45
Urgent Location 155 47 37 0.107 0 0.135 3.16 1,120 2,502 58.551 1,251
Table 2. Experimental results according to type of repair.
create a TDT for the faulty models, and the longest TDT has a length of Ln.
TarTar computed for the TDTs overall a number #R repairs of which #A are
admissible. An admissible repair is found for #S of the TDTs. The computa-
tion effort for a repair analysis is given by the time TQE for successful quantifier
elimination, the number of timeouts #O of quantifier eliminations after 10 min-
utes, the average time TR to compute a repair and the memory consumption
MR. The constraint system that Z3 solves has the count #Vr of variables and
#Cn of constraints. The effort for the admissibility check is given in time TAdm
and memory MA. All times are given in seconds and memory consumption in
MB. Notice that we omit the columns pertaining to the fault seeding and TDT
computation in Table 2 as they are irrelevant here.
Overall, TarTar seeded 4.508 faults. This resulted in 175 TDTs in total
(60 TDTs due to bound modification, 72 due to operator variation, 27 due to
changing the clock reference, 8 due to complementing the reset of clocks and
8 due to the switching of urgent locations). TarTar found 5,355 repairs, out
of which 1,169 were admissible. It found at least one admissible repair for 122
of the TDTs. The maximal number of modified constraints in the admissible
repairs computed for a single TDT using all types of analysis was 25.
Interpretation. Few of the seeded faults resulted in a property violation. TarTar
seeded 4.508 faults which led to 175 TDTs, thus only 3.9% of these faults result in
a TDT. This supports the hypothesis that, in practice, often times only few time
constraints have an impact on a property violation. TarTar computes at least
one admissible repair by bound modification for 85 (48%) of the 175 TDTs, by
operator variation for 51 (29%), by clock reference for 35 (20%), by clock reset for
13 (7%) and by urgent location for 37 (21%). Every analysis on its own computes
less admissible repairs than the combination of all repair analyses, which solves
122 (69%) of the 175 TDTs. The largest number of modified constraints in all
the admissible repairs for a single TDT was 25, which is less than anticipated.
This low number of modified constraints infer that, for the examples that we
considered, only a few constraints of each TDT combined to admissible repairs.
The number of modified constraints determines the number of possible repairs
that have an impact on whether a property is violated or not. Since it was
observed in [KLW19] that the computational effort for the repair computation is
largely determined by the quantifier elimination step, we expect that in light of
the observed 226 timeouts a more efficient quantifier elimination would lead to
a significantly higher number of repairs. Furthermore, the number of timeouts,
and thus the computation time needed for the repair, rises with the length of
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the analyzed TDT. The model SBR has the most timeouts with 86 and the
third longest trace with a length of 84 steps. The model bando has the third
most timeouts with 46 and the longest trace. Obviously, the longer the TDT,
the larger the resulting constraint system, leading to increased computational
effort. The bando model has the largest constraint system with 1, 156 variables
and 8, 144 constraints. The SBR model has the second largest constraint system
with 765 variables and 1, 211 constraints. The model FDDI has a shorter trace
of length of 11 and a much smaller constraint system with 116 variables and
272 constraints. From this we conclude that the complexity of a repair depends
not only on the trace length, but also on the intrinsic complexity of the model.
Modifying states from urgent to non-urgent during fault seeding resulted in
only 8 TDTs. This low number is due to the observation that the considered
models contain only few urgent states. Modifying non-urgent states to urgent
ones, however, did not lead to a single property violation resulting in a TDT.
The rationale is that urgency ensures to leave a state immediately without a
delay which leads to a restriction rather than a relaxation regarding the time
budget spent along an execution trace. As a consequence, making a state urgent
does not cause a property violation in many models since the type of the checked
properties is typically time bounded reachability, and a restricted time budget
does not make it more likely that the property is violated. We finally observe
that the admissibility check requires more computation resources than the repair
computation. The maximal memory used for the admissibility test was 1, 251MB
in contrast to 37.16MB for the repair computation. This is in line with our
expectation since the admissibility test searches the state space of the full NTA,
while the repair analyses only considers a single TDT.
7 Conclusion
We have presented the TarTar tool, its architecture and implementation, and
illustrated its application to a number of significant case studies. In the course
of our work we have extended the repair analysis that is implemented in Tar-
Tar for bound modification to modifications of comparison operators, clock
references, reset of clocks and missing urgencies. The evaluation of the repair
analyses showed that an admissible repair is computed for at least 69% of the
analyzed TDTs. The integration of various tools with heterogeneous interfaces
posed a particular challenge to the architecture of TarTar which we addressed
by the definition of intermediate artifacts.
In future work we plan to explore the interplay between different repairs that
are computed for a repaired system that still violates a property, and develop
refined strategies to select promising repairs from a repair set. A further gener-
alization of the analysis is to not only compute clock constraint modifications
for faulty models but also to compute possible relaxations of clock constraints
for correct models in order to support design space exploration.
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